In the event of an outbreak of Avian Influenza (AI) the countryside would not be closed down as it was during the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in 2001. The situation would be very different for the following reasons:
-- Avian influenza is a very different virus to FMD. It is less contagious, its survival time is shorter and it does not independently travel long distances through the air. Therefore it is not expected to spread over such a wide area as FMD did or to be as difficult to contain;
-- The lessons of the 2001 FMD outbreak have been identified in a series of independent reports and have been widely implemented. We have new and up to date contingency plans which are risk-based, proportionate and flexible. In particular, we would dispose of culled birds through incineration, rendering and burial in licensed landfill. We would not dispose of carcases through on farm pyres;
-- Our plans now also include flexible contingency arrangements that address the risks of damage and disruption to rural communities, economies and the environment. Our policy response is therefore able to reflect potential impact on countryside, access and recreation, tourism, other rural businesses, biodiversity and the wellbeing of those who live and/or work in the countryside;
* The legal powers for avian influenza differ in key respects from the FMD legislation that applied in 2001, being more proportionate to the risks involved, eg powers to close footpaths are far more restricted.
Access to land
In the event of an avian influenza outbreak there would be little need to restrict access to land by closing footpaths or other land to which there is a right of access. We are only taking legal powers to close land in the immediate vicinity (ie a minimum of 3km) of an infected premises and only then if justified by the veterinary risk of disease spread. Local Authorities do not have any additional powers to close land.
If an outbreak were to be in an intensive indoor unit, no closure of any land or any other restriction is likely to be needed. If there were an outbreak in free range holdings or in the wild bird population it would not usually be necessary or practical to close land, though we would need to take account of any special factors that might apply in individual cases. For example, if disease were found in a nature reserve, decisions on whether land was closed within 10km of that finding might depend on factors such as the presence of defined paths for visitors and the degree of contamination of those paths. Our working precedent is last summer's outbreak of Newcastle Disease which required no land closures other than the suspension of one stretch of footpath which directly crossed the infected site. In an avian influenza outbreak, there may well be public pressure to close access to land, especially where an infected wild bird were found, but we would seek to strike a balance between addressing legitimate public concern and ensuring our response was proportionate to the risk. If access to land does need to be restricted, we are working with Natural England to ensure that clear and up to date information is provided as to where those areas are.
Visiting the countryside
There should therefore, be no need for people to stop visiting the countryside. Our Contingency plan for Avian Influenza (and other animal diseases) includes a protocol which makes clear that there should be a presumption in favour of maintaining public access. It also makes clear that any decision to close land over which there is a public of right of way, or where there is public open space or access to open country, should be taken only when it is clearly necessary to do so and after having carefully considered:
-- the requirement for disease control;
-- the economic value of the rights of way network and other countryside access and the likely impact of closure on visitors to the countryside and the businesses that depend on them.
The vast majority of visitor attractions in rural areas would be unaffected. Defra and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport are working with Visit Britain and other tourism and heritage organisations such as the National Trust, to ensure that the public would be given accurate and balanced advice about access to the countryside and rural visitor sites in the event of an avian influenza outbreak and that this message is also put across in advance of an outbreak.
Economic impact
The economic impact of an avian influenza outbreak would therefore be principally felt by the poultry and ancillary industries (pigs can also be susceptible to certain strains of avian influenza and could be controlled on premises with infected birds). In an outbreak, national controls on poultry movements would be put in place and we would require birds to be housed or otherwise isolated from wild birds. Depending crucially on the scale and geographical spread of disease, this could create economic pressures on a fast-moving industry, but we are working with the industry to ensure that movements could continue to take place under general or specific licences. We have also negotiated provisions permitting organic and free range status to be retained in certain circumstances in the event of a housing requirement.
Clearly the export market would be severely restricted and domestic poultry and egg consumption would be likely to experience a temporary downturn. Following the first avian influenza case in Turkey in December, the UK poultrymeat market slumped by about 10% over a single weekend (although picking up again within a couple of weeks to near normal). In Italy and Greece poultrymeat markets slumped more dramatically (up to 80% with some producers going bankrupt). We will continue to work closely with the Food Standards Agency and Department of Health to ensure that consumers receive appropriate advice on the safety of poultry meat and eggs.
If an outbreak were to be prolonged or become widespread, the combined financial impact of disease, movement controls, export and domestic market difficulties would be likely to have a negative effect on rural employment, both in the poultry industry itself and also in related industries including feed merchants, agricultural suppliers, meat and egg processors and hauliers. The poultry industry employs a large number of migrant workers and loss of these jobs would create problems, particularly in rural areas of high social deprivation.
The latest (2003) estimate of the value of poultry production is Ј1.2 billion and around 28,000 people are employed in the sector. Exports are worth about Ј75 million for live birds and in excess of Ј200 million for products. The UK egg industry is worth around Ј660 million and employs around 10,000 people.
Game shooting and other rural activities.
Veterinary advice is that there is no need at present to restrict activities such as game shooting. However, that assessment may change depending on the level of risk or, if we have an outbreak, its scale and duration. Recent Commission decisions require all shooting and bird gatherings to be banned within 10km of the finding of an infected wild bird. Shooting and related activities may therefore need to be restricted if they create a significant risk of disease spread through large gatherings of people or birds, or cause the dispersal of wild birds. While game birds are captive they would also be subject to movement restrictions. However, such controls would be proportionate and risk-based and, depending on the circumstances of an outbreak, restrictions could be limited to the areas where disease is present.
In an outbreak, any farmed game premises affected by movement controls would not be able to restock their supplies until the controls were lifted. The game industry is heavily dependent on the import of French chicks, importing 3 million poults during the season. We understand that the British Association for Shooting and Conservation has advised UK shoots to source poults and chicks from local sources, which will help to minimise the impact of movement restrictions in an outbreak. We are also advising the industry to acquire their birds as hatching eggs and day old chicks rather than poults in order to minimise the risk of introducing disease and to reduce the impact of a possible restriction on trade if disease should be found in the exporting French region.
In October 2005, during the autumn migration, we introduced a ban on bird gatherings, such as sales and shows, falconry events and domestic pigeon racing. However, since December we have permitted such events by general licence on the condition that event organisers inform their local Animal Health Office and comply with biosecurity rules. If the level of risk increases, we would review whether to re-instate the ban. We are keeping under review our existing ban on international pigeon racing which reflects the higher level of risk of disease being brought in from abroad.
Combating stress
Reflecting clear lessons from the FMD outbreak of 2001, our contingency plans include the immediate notification of an experts group on rural stress. The current Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group would fulfil that role.
Depending on the type of emergency, there are established organisations well placed to provide specialist support. This is especially the case for the farming industry where, under the banner of Farming Help, the Rural Stress Information Network, ARC-Addington Fund, Royal Agricultural Benevolent Institution and the Samaritans promote confidential help for all in the farming community. Those organisations would be well placed to lead on the delivery of any emergency support to the industry should it be needed.
The Plan has already helped fund many initiatives with Ј300,000 per annum being committed by Defra until 2008. Initiatives include the development of regional support networks and the production of a 'Farm Help' card giving contact details of relevant organisations. The Plan aims to provide a confidential helpline and support for those suffering stress. During FMD in 2001 these networks were strategically well placed to deal with such calls. The same help could be utilised and focused on those affected by an AI outbreak.
Precautions that can be taken now
At present, in the absence of disease, poultry keepers do not need to restrict access to land where their flocks roam. However, it is always sensible biosecurity practice (and recommended both as a precaution against avian influenza and other more common poultry diseases such as salmonella, campylobacter and bronchitis) that poultry keepers should limit access to their flocks, particularly to buildings and enclosures where they are kept in large numbers. Only essential visitors should have access to these areas and they should make sure that they carry out biosecurity procedures both before and after contact with birds and wear protective clothing so that disease is not spread indirectly through contaminated clothing, footwear and any vehicles where birds have been confined in small areas.
It is unlikely that contamination can be spread by walkers using fields where free range poultry are kept, although basic precautions such as cleaning footwear should be undertaken. Visitors should not give food to any farm animals or birds or leave food anywhere where they may get access to it. We would also advise the public to avoid contact with bird faeces and ill or dead birds and, in case of any contact, to take simple hygienic measures i.e. wash any contaminated skin, clothing or footwear with soap and water. Further biosecurity advice...
defra.uk
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